Critique of the Juvenile Death Penalty in the United States: A Global Perspective by Edwards, Lori
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 42 Number 2 Article 6 
2004 
Critique of the Juvenile Death Penalty in the United States: A 
Global Perspective 
Lori Edwards 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lori Edwards, Critique of the Juvenile Death Penalty in the United States: A Global Perspective, 42 Duq. L. 
Rev. 317 (2004). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol42/iss2/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Critique of the Juvenile Death Penalty in the
United States: A Global Perspective
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1990, only seven countries in the world have been docu-
mented as executing juvenile offenders: Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the
United States of America.! Yemen has now outlawed the execu-
tions of juveniles and the President of Pakistan, in accordance
with legislation passed in 2000, commuted the death sentences of
all death row juvenile offenders.2 Of the remaining countries that
execute childhood offenders, the United States has carried out the
largest number of known executions.3 This raises the question of
whether, in doing so, the United States is violating international
treaties to which it is a party and other treaties that, although not
a party to, are accepted by many of the world's nations.
II. THE UNITED STATES' STANCE, INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND
THE WORLD VIEW
The application of the death penalty to juvenile offenders is a
concept that is older than the Constitution of the United States.
The first documented juvenile execution was that of Thomas
Graunger in 1642 in Plymouth Colony, Massachusetts.4 Since
then, 366 juvenile offenders have been executed in the United
States and of these, twenty-two were executed between 1973 and
2003.5
1. Amnesty International USA, Juvenile Offenders, at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/ eventldpjuveniles.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
2. Id.
3. Amnesty International, Juveniles and The Death Penalty: Executions Worldwide
since 1990, at httpJ/www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/ACT500111998 (last visited Oct. 10,
2003).
4. Victor L. Streib, The Twenty -Third Annual Law Review Symposium The Ultimate
Penalty: A Multifarious Look at Capital Punishment: Symposium Article: Emerging Issues
in Juvenile Death Penalty Law, 26 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 725, 728 n.17 (2000). Graunger,
a sixteen year old boy, was convicted of bestiality with a mare and a cow. "Following the
letter of the law of Leviticus, the good citizens of Plymouth Colony first killed the mare,
then the cow, then all the calves, and then the boy." Id.
5. Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and Execu-
tions for Juvenile Crimes: January 1, 1973 - June 30, 2003, at
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While the United States continues its policy of sentencing juve-
niles to the death penalty, international standards have moved
away from the death penalty in favor of protection for those under
the age of eighteen.6 The international movement was not so
much an immediate shift in the popular consensus as it was a
gradual change that began in 1948 with the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.7 Signed in 1948 by the United States, the
document's preamble states, "[m]ember States have pledged
themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the
promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights
and fundamental freedoms."' The Declaration specifically man-
dates in Article 5 that "no one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."9 While
the death penalty is not explicitly referred to in the Declaration,
the Declaration would later become acknowledged as one of the
first document to recognize universal rights and to develop a plan
to implement those rights among all member states.10
In 1977, two additional Protocols were added to the Geneva
Convention that directly addressed the execution of juveniles. In
the first Protocol, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, the death penalty for an offense
related to armed conflict would not be carried out on individuals
under the age of eighteen at the time of the act." In the secohd
Protocol, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Au-
gust 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, individuals who were not eighteen
at the time of the offense, who were pregnant, or who were moth-
http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/juvdeath.htm (last visited July 1, 2003). The most
recent execution occurred on April 3, 2003 in Oklahoma. Id.
6. See BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, 192-195 (Ian Brownlie CBE, Q.C.
ed., Oxford University Press 2002). See also All Human Rights For All: 1948-1998, Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 10, 2003).
7. BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6.
8. Id. at 192.
9. Id. at 193.
10. Christopher R. Rossi, Broken Chain of Being: James Brown Scott and the Origins
of Modern International Law, 28 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO 150, 152 (2000).
11. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Article 77, 5, avail-
able at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/BH707.txt (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
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ers of young children would not receive the death penalty.' 2 While
the United States was the motivating force behind the first Ge-
neva Convention in 1864 and a signatory to its multiple successive
treaties, the United States has not ratified the two protocols from
1977.1'
The next significant agreement, which went into effect in 1978,
was the American Convention on Human Rights. 4 It contained a
statement that no person under 18 years of age or over 70 nor any
pregnant woman would receive the death penalty. 5 The United
States signed the Convention but never ratified it."8
In 1984, the United Nations endorsed the Safeguards Guaran-
teeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty,
which signified the strong agreement that existed among nations
regarding the minimization, if not the abolition, of the death pen-
alty. 7 However, since the document was not voted upon, it is not
legally binding.18 The document states that no person under the
age of eighteen at the time of the crime will be sentenced to death
nor will such a penalty be used on pregnant women, new mothers,
or those who have become insane. 9
In 1990, the Convention on the Rights of the Child came into
force.2" It included a statement that children under the age of
eighteen would not be sentenced to capital punishment or life im-
12. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Article 6, 4, at
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/BH708.txt (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
13. Amy E. Eckhert, "Unlawful Combatants" or "Prisoner of War" The Law and Politics
of Labels, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59, 66 (2003). The United States did ratify the treaties
that arose in 1883, 1907, 1929, and 1949. Id. Protocols I and II contain numerous clauses
beyond the ones cited and it would be unfair to assume that the only reason that the United
States has not ratified the treaty is because of these statements.
14. American Convention on Human Rights Pact of San Jose Costa Rico, Article 4, 95,
at http'//www.oas.org/juridico/englishfTreaties/b-32.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
15. Id.
16. Kent V. Anderson, Jonathan E. Hawley, Richard H. Parsons, Challenging the De-
tention of a Client Who Has Been Declared a Material Witness or the Incommunicado Deten-
tion of any Client, 27 MAR-CHAMP 14, 22 (2003).
17. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Safeguards Guaranteeing
Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, at
http'//www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_comp4l.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
18. Annika K. Carlsten, Young Enough to Die? Executing Juvenile Offenders in Viola-
tion of International Law, 29 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 181, 193 (2001).
19. Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Pen-
alty, 3, at http'//www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/hcomp4l.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
20. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the
Child, available at http'/www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm (last visited Oct. 10,
2003).
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prisonment without the possibility of release.2 At least 191 na-
tions ratified this United Nations document with the exception of
two countries, Somalia and the United States.22
III. THE UNITED STATES' RESERVATION TO INTERNATIONAL VIEWS
ON JUVENILE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
While the United States may not be a part of many of the trea-
ties that contain prohibitions on the execution of juveniles, it is a
member of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (hereinafter "ICCPR). 23 Before the United States ratified
the ICCPR in 1992, it entered five reservations.24 Among them
was a reservation to Article 6, which prohibited the execution of
persons under eighteen, a stipulation that is contrary to the terms
of the ICCPR because Article 4 prohibits derogations from Article
6.25 The United States also included an affirmation of its right to
try juveniles as adults in certain circumstances.26 Of the 144 sig-
natories to the treaty, the United States was the only nation that
entered a reservation to Article 6. This resulted in eleven foreign
nations filing complaints against the United States with the Hu-
21man Rights Commission.
IV. DETERMINING INTERNATIONAL LAW
Treaties are an important tool for comparing the policy of the
United States with the world-view because they are sources that
help to determine whether domestic laws comport with interna-
21. Id. at Article 37(a).
22. Riga Swan, Ph.D., Moral, Economic, and Social Issues in Children's Health Care:
On Statutes Depriving a Class of Children of Rights to Medical Care: Can this Discrimina-
tion be Litigated?, 2 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 73 (1998/1999). The United States signed
the document in 1996 but never ratified it. See Ex parte Marcus Pressley, 770 So. 2d 143,
148 (Ala. 2000).
23. Erica Templeton, Killing Kids: The Impact of Domingues v. Nevada on the Juvenile
Death Penalty as a Violation of International Law, 41 B.C. L. REV 1175, 1185 (September
2000).
24. ScoTT N. CARLSON & GREGORY GIsvoLD, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL & POLITICAL RIGHTS 201-221 (Transitional Publishers, Inc. 2003). See
also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Declarations and Reservations,
at http://www.hri.ca/fortherecordl997/documentation/reservations/ccpr.htm, pg. 15-16 (last
visited July 26, 2002).
25. United Nations Treaty Collections, at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty5-asp.htm (modified Feb. 5, 2002). Specifically
see Article 6, 15. Id.
26. Id.
27. Templeton, supra note 21, at 1186.
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tional treaties and policies. In deciding a juvenile death penalty
case, domestic constitutional law may provide a basis for appeal,
particularly the Eight Amendment dealing with cruel and unusual
punishment, but international law may also be introduced. The
three primary sources of international law are treaties, customary
international law, and jus cogens norms.8 Jus Cogens are "those
from which no derogation can be justified and which can only be
changed by a subsequent norm of the same character." 9 The United
States Supreme Court, as early as 1804, stated, "an act of Con-
gress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains."" It is clear that this
ideology has filtered down to the lower courts as exemplified by a
1980 opinion that stated, "[u]pon ratification of the Constitution,
the thirteen former colonies were fused into a single nation, one
which, in its relations with foreign states, is bound both to observe
and construe the accepted norms of international law."'
The Supreme Court has employed customary international law
as a basis for deciding cases, and, as a result, the issue of whether
or not the abolition of the juvenile death penalty has become cus-
tomary and ajus cogens norm is raised. After evaluating Protocol
I and Protocol II to the Geneva Convention, 2 the American Con-
vention on Human Rights,33 the Safeguards Guaranteeing the Pro-
tection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty," the
Covenant on the Rights of the Child," and the International Cove-
28. Linda Jane Springrose, Strangers in a Strange Land: The Rights of Non-Citizens
Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
185, 207 (1999).
29. Chrissy Fox, Implications of the United States' Reservations and Non-Self-Executing
Declaration to the ICCPR for Capital Offenders and Foreign Relations, 11 TUL.J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 303, 321-22 (2003).
30. Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 81 (1804).
31. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1980).
32. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Article 77, 5, at
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/BH707.txt (last visited Oct. 10, 2003); Protocol Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Vic-
tims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Article 6, 94, available at
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/BH708.txt (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
33. American Convention on Human Rights Pact of San Jose Costa Rico, Article 4, 5,
at http'/www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treatiesb-32.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
34. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Safeguards Guaranteeing
Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, at
http'//www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/hcomp4l.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
35. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the




nant on Civil and Political Rights,36 a strong argument exists that
the international norm is no longer one that supports the execu-
tion of juvenile offenders.
V. UNITED STATES CASE LAW
The issue of whether the United States is fulfilling its obliga-
tions arising from the treaties to which it is a party was recently
raised in Domingues v. Nevada.37 When Domingues was seven-
teen, he was convicted of murdering a woman and her four-year-
old son, a crime Domingues committed when he was sixteen.38
Following his sentence, he filed a motion for a correction of illegal
sentence arguing that the "execution of a juvenile offender violates
an international treaty ratified by the United States and violates
customary international law."39 The treaty Domingues was refer-
ring to was the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (hereinafter "ICCPR").40  The Supreme Court of Nevada
held that since the United States entered a reservation to the arti-
cle forbidding the imposition of the death penalty on those under
eighteen, Domingues was not illegally sentenced.4 However, the
opinion did not discuss whether sentencing a juvenile to the death
penalty was contrary to customary international law.
Judge Rose noted in his dissenting opinion that since the ICCPR
indicates there is to be no derogation from the prohibition on the
execution of those under eighteen,"' the real issue is whether or
not the United States is a party to the treaty. 3 If the reservation
was essential to the United States acceptance of the entire treaty,
the ratification may be null.' However, if evidence exists that the
United States intended to accept the treaty as a whole, it could be
36. PRACTICAL GUIDE To THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL & POLITICAL
RIGHTS 201-21, supra note 22.
37. 961 P.2d 1279 (1998).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Office of the High Commissions for Human Rights, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a-ccpr.htm (last visited
Oct. 10, 2003).
41. Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1280.
42. Office of the High Commissions for Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a-ccpr.htm (last visited Oct.
10, 2003). Article 4 lists several articles that should not be derogated from, including Arti-
cle 6.
43. Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1281 (Rose, J., dissenting).
44. Id. (Rose, J., dissenting).
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bound by all of the provisions regardless of the reservation.45 As a
result, Justice Rose would reverse the denial of Domingues' mo-
tion by the district court and remand the case for a hearing on the
impact of the ICCPR on juvenile sentencing.46
The Supreme Court of Alabama in Ex parte Pressley also exam-
ined the issue of whether the United States' reservation to the
ICCPR was invalid.47 Pressley was sentenced to death for murder-
ing two individuals during the course of a robbery when he was
under the age of eighteen.48 On appeal, he raised the issue of
whether international law and international treaties prohibit the
execution of juvenile offenders.49 The court was not convinced that
the Senate's reservation to the ICCPR was illegal.5 ° The opinion
further noted that state laws permitting the imposition of the
death penalty for those under eighteen have withstood constitu-
tional scrutiny in spite of the existence of different treaties.5'
However, the court cited cases that were based on constitutional
law rather than international law, thereby addressing the sepa-
rate issue of whether the treaty controlled, rather than how inter-
national law applies to the death penalty.
The first case referenced in Ex parte Pressley held that sixteen
and seventeen year-old individuals could be sentenced to death
without violating the Eighth Amendment's bar on cruel and un-
usual punishment. 2  Four Justices, Brennan, Marshall, Black-
mun and Stevens, dissented in the Stanford opinion noting that
the execution of juvenile offenders violates contemporary stan-
dards of decency and is seen as unacceptable in the international
realm. 3
The second case cited in Ex Parte Pressley, and based on Eighth
Amendment grounds, is Thompson v. Oklahoma, a precursor to
Stanford.' The Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendment barred the execution of an individual who was
sixteen years of age or younger at the time the crime was commit-
45. Id. (Rose, J., dissenting).
46. Id. (Rose, J., dissenting).
47. Ex parte Pressley, 770 So.2d 143 (Ala. 2000).
48. Id. at 144.
49. Id. at 147. Pressley also challenged the State's use of peremptory strikes. Id. at
144.
50. Id. at 148.
51. Id. at 148.
52. 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989).
53. Id. at 405.
54. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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ted.55 The opinion stated that "it would offend civilized standards
of decency to execute a person ... less than 16 years old at the
time of his or her offense [which] is consistent with the views...
expressed by . ..other nations that share our Anglo-American
heritage, and by the leading members of the Western European
community."56
Reviewing these two Supreme Court cases, Stanford and
Thompson, it would appear that the cases upon which the Su-
preme Court of Alabama relied do not actually support its holding
in Pressley.7 Not only are the holdings in Stanford and Thompson
based on constitutional law, but also the remarks made by the Su-
preme Court relating to international law appear to favor the ex-
clusion of juvenile capital punishment rather than support its re-
tention.
Particularly troubling in Ex parte Pressley is the concurring
opinion of Judge Houston, who believed that although the Senate
reservations to the ICCPR may not be valid, the Supreme Court's
failure to grant certiorari in Domingues was controlling.58 Judge
Houston acknowledges that a refusal to grant review is not
equivalent to a statement on the merits of the case.59 Yet, he con-
cludes that because there are times when the United States Su-
preme Court will give reasons, unrelated to the merits, for not
granting review and this was not one of those times, he could as-
sume that certiorari was denied based on the merits.' However,
even the Judge himself is not convinced by this line of reasoning,
and ends his opinion with, "I concur in the result, and I pray in
doing so I am not committing an 'unforgivable act."'
One of the more recent cases that raised the issue of the ICCPR
was Servin v. Nevada.62 Servin was sentenced to death by lethal
injection for the murder and robbery of a woman, a crime he com-
mitted when he was sixteen years old.63 While the Supreme Court
of Nevada upheld its decision in Domingues, it reversed Servin's
death sentence based upon a state statute that required the court
55. Id. at 838.
56. Id. at 830.
57. Recall that Pressley purported to examine whether or not the United State's reser-
vation to the ICCPR is valid, which is an issue of international and not constitutional law.
58. Pressley, 770 So.2d at 151 (Houston, J., concurring).
59. Id. (Houston, J., concurring).
60. Id. (Houston, J., concurring).
61. Id. (Houston, J., concurring).
62. 32 P.3d 1277 (Nev. 2001).
63. Servin, 32 P.3d at 1280.
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to consider Servin's age at the time of the offense as a mitigating
factor, which would make the death penalty excessive punish-
ment.' Servin was re-sentenced to two consecutive life sentences
without the possibility of parole.65
VI. THE UNITED STATES MAY REVIEW ITS STANCE
In 2002, three United States Supreme Court cases suggest that
the future of the juvenile death penalty rests on shaky grounds."
In June, the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia.67 Atkins
was convicted of abduction, armed robbery and capital murder and
sentenced to death. 68 On appeal, Atkins argued that he is "men-
tally retarded" and, therefore, could not be sentenced to death. 9
The United States Supreme Court, overruling the Supreme Court
of Virginia and relying primarily on the Eighth Amendment, held
that sentencing a mentally retarded criminal to the death penalty
is excessive punishment." Contained in the Court's reasoning,
though, are references to mental capacity and childlike qualities,
which could be revisited when deciding future juvenile death pen-
alty cases.7 1
In the second case, Patterson v. Texas, a divided United States
Supreme Court denied a stay of execution and petition for certio-
rari from Patterson for the capital murder he committed when he
was seventeen years old.72 Justice Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer
dissented in the decision of the Court. 3  Justice Stevens refer-
enced his continued belief that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the imposition of the death penalty on defendants below eighteen
years of age, a statement he first concurred in when Justice Bren-
nan dissented in Stanford.4 Stevens wrote in Patterson:
Since that opinion [in Stanford] was written, the issue has
been the subject of further debate and discussion both in this
64. Id. at 1290. See also NEV. REV. STAT. §200.035(6).
65. Id. at 1290.
66. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002);
In re Stanford, 123 S. Ct. 472 (2002).
67. 536 U.S. 304.
68. Id. at 307.
69. Id. at 310.
70. Id. at 321.
71. See id. at 310, 314 n.8, 316, 318.





country and in other civilized nations. Given the apparent
consensus that exists among the States and in the interna-
tional community against the execution of a capital sentence
imposed on a juvenile offender, I think it would be appropri-
ate for the Court to revisit the issue at the earliest opportu-
nity.75 Justice Ginsburg and Breyer also stated that it was
time the holding in Stanford be revisited, especially because
of the Court's recent decision in Atkins.76
Finally, in In re Stanford, the United States Supreme Court de-
nied a petitioner's application for writ of habeas corpus requesting
the Court to hold his execution unconstitutional since he was un-
der the age of eighteen when he committed the offense." The
Court, however, was again split in its decision, with Justices Ste-
vens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting. 8 These justices
believed that, given their recent decision in Atkins and the bare
majority of the Court that supported the holding in the 1989 Stan-
ford case, the juvenile death penalty should be reconsidered.79 The
dissent referenced the twenty-eight states that expressly forbid
the execution of juvenile offenders and the thirty states that forbid
the execution of "mentally retarded" individuals." Given the ap-
parent policy of the states, the Court found it unjust that there is
such a disparate result between the two groups.81 Justice Stevens,
authoring the dissent, concluded by stating,
[a]ll of this leads me to conclude that offenses committed by
juveniles under the age of 18 do not merit the death penalty.
The practice of executing such offenders is a relic of the past
and is inconsistent with evolving standards of decency in a




77. 123 S. Ct. 472. See also Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002).
78. Stanford, 537 U.S. 968.
79. Id. at 472 (dissenting op.). The dissenting justices stated that, "In Atkins, we held
that the Constitution prohibits the application of the death penalty to mentally retarded
persons. The reasons supporting that holding, with one exception, apply with equal or
greater force to the execution ofjuvenile offenders." Id.
80. Id. at 472-73 (dissenting op.).
81. Id. (dissenting op.).
82. Id. at 475 (dissenting op.).
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VII. THE CURRENT STATUS OF JUVENILE DEATH Row INMATES
In the United States, there are currently seventy-eight indi-
viduals on death row who received death sentences for crimes they
committed when they were juveniles. 3 While the international
community continues to require a statement in its treaties and in
its documents that capital punishment for juveniles will not be
tolerated, the United States maintains its policy of sentencing ju-
veniles to the death penalty. As the only member nation to the
ICCPR that entered a reservation to this prohibition, and one of
only five countries that continue to execute juveniles, the hope of
change is not promising.4 Whether the United States is violating
international customs and norms as well as international treaties
by continuing the executions is an issue independent of personal
belief systems.
While state courts have held that the reservations to the ICCPR
are valid and have continued to sentence juveniles based on this
belief,85 the United States Supreme Court has yet to decide the
issue. Even though the Supreme Court has stated, through a bare
majority, that the juvenile death penalty is not unconstitutional
based on the Eighth Amendment," it has never based its decision
on international law. Especially in light of the Court's recent de-
cision in Atkins and the apparent split among the justices, the is-
sue of whether the United States will recognize a prohibition
against the juvenile death penalty could soon be decided. The
question is, will the court strike the juvenile death penalty down
on Eighth Amendment grounds, by analogizing to its holding in
Atkins, or will it strike it down by showing deference to interna-
tional norms and treaties?
Justice Blackmun, suggesting a decision based on all of the
above standards, noted in an address regarding juvenile capital
83. American Bar Association, Factsheet: The Juvenile Death Penalty (last modified
April, 2003) www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/juvdp.html. Although these individuals were
between 16 and 17 when they committed the crimes which resulted in their sentence, they
are currently between the ages of 19 and 42.
84. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at
http://www.fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/BH498.txt, Article 4 paragraph 2; Article 6, para-
graph 5, pg. 2, 3, accessed July 24, 2002. See also International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: Declarations and Reservations, at
http://www.hri.ca/fortherecordl997/documentation/reservations/ccpr.htm, pg. 18-19, ac-
cessed July 26, 2002.
85. See Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1279; Pressley, 770 So. 2d at 143; and Servin, 32 P. 3d
at 1277.
86. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 361.
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punishment that the "interpretation of the Eighth Amendment,
no less than that of treaties and statutes, should be informed by a
decent respect for the global opinions of mankind."87 He went on
to say, "although the recent decisions of the Supreme Court do not
offer much hope for the immediate future, I look forward to the
day when the Supreme Court, too, will inform its opinions almost
all the time with a decent respect to the opinions of mankind."88
VIII. CONCLUSION
Given the standards iterated in Protocol I and Protocol II to the
Geneva Convention, the American Convention on Human Rights,
the Safeguards Guaranteeing the Protection of the Rights of those
Facing the Death Penalty, the Covenant on the Rights of the Child
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it is
hard to imagine that the customary international law and the jus
cogens are anything less than in opposition to the juvenile death
penalty. The United States, however, has temporarily avoided the
issue by placing reservations to the topic in the ICCPR, something
that the document itself expressly prohibits.
As the world moves away from the acceptance of capital pun-
ishment for juvenile offenders, states may do likewise in their leg-
islation. America currently has forty death penalty jurisdictions.89
Eighteen of those mandate a minimum age of eighteen at the time
the offense was committed before the penalty can be imposed.9"
Five of them have chosen the age of seventeen, and the other sev-
enteen jurisdictions use the age of sixteen.91 Thirteen jurisdic-
tions do not apply the death penalty at all.92
87. Justice Blackmun, Justice Blackmun Addresses ASIL Annual Dinner, The Ameri-
can Society of International Law, March, 1994, at 5.
88. Id.
89. Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and Execu-
tions for Juvenile Crimes: January 1, 1973 - June 30, 2003 (last modified July 1, 2003), at
http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/juvdeath.htm. This calculation includes 38 states
and the federal government, both civilian and military. Id.
90. Id. The jurisdictions setting the minimum death penalty age at eighteen are: Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Washington, Federal Civil-
ian, and Federal Military. Id.
91. Id. The five jurisdictions setting the minimum age at seventeen are: Florida,
Georgia, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Texas. Id.
92. Id. The American jurisdictions without the death penalty are: Alaska, District of
Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
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Whether the United States Supreme Court will reconsider its
view on the juvenile death penalty in light of Atkins remains un-
determined. In reality, it is becoming increasingly clear that if the
juvenile death penalty is declared unconstitutional, it will not be
because of current international standards. Rather, current case
law indicates it will be overturned on Eighth Amendment
grounds. Hopefully, though, the decision will contain some refer-
ence to the importance of international norms in our legal system.
The American Bar Association, embracing many of the concepts
contained in the treaties and documents seeking the abolition of
the juvenile death penalty, stated thorough its President, Alfred
P. Carlton, Jr., that:
Our position is not grounded on sympathy, but rather on
common decency and fundamental justice, and the notion that
we should punish according to culpability. We should reserve
the most severe punishment for the worst offenders. Execut-
ing child offenders is inconsistent with these concepts. This
does not suggest that teenagers should not face punishment
for violating society's laws. It does mean that they should not
pay for their mistakes with their lives .... We dare not hold
children accountable for their actions to the same degree as
we do adults. To do so serves no principle purpose and only
demeans our system of justice."
So even if the United States has not yet removed its derogations to
the ICCPR or supported international views on the topic of the
juvenile death penalty, there is an indication that our country's
legal and political views are reaching a point that is consistent
with those contained in international documents: that the death
penalty should not be used in juvenile convictions, that it does not
respect the "opinions of mankind," and "that it serves no principle
purpose and only demeans our system of justice." Perhaps the
situation is best summed up by Mariam Wright Edelman, founder
and president of the Children's Defense Fund, who said, "If we
don't stand up for children, then we don't stand up for much."94
Lori Edwards
93. American Bar Association, Overview of the Juvenile Death Penalty Today (last
modified Spring 2003), at www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/juvdp.html.
94. See Children Quotes, at http://www.wisdomquotes.com/catchildren.html (last vis-
ited Dec. 4, 2003).
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